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Afghanistan are fighting with such powerful
determination to resist the Taliban attempt to
return the country to the status coup ante, i.e.
the conditions of Pushtun internal colonial-
ism before the onset of anti-Communist jihad
(1978).
The ultimate product of 
person-centred tribal 
Pushtun political culture
Finally, the ultimate product of the person-
centred, tribal Pushtun political culture in
Afghanistan is the rise of the Taliban militia
movement with its enigmatic, and increasing-
ly apotheosized leader and his militantly anti-
S h ica, anti-modern, anti-Western, anti-
women, and especially anti-democratic poli-
cies and practices. The Taliban's 'divinely or-
dained' reclusive leader, Mullah Umar, was
proclaimed on 4 April 1996, by a gathering of
some 1,200 mullahs in Kandahar, the spiritual
capital of Talibanism, as the Amirul Mu›m i-
neen (Commander of the Faithful). As such, he
is the ultimate source for articulating and en-
forcing the 'new' Muslim orthodoxy/ortho-
praxy of Talibanism in Afghanistan – the basis
of his legitimacy.
The Taliban project themselves as the bear-
ers of peace and 'true Islamic justice' in the
country, a form of justice bent on the enforce-
ment of the harshest principles of hudud in the
s h a r ica. Such punishments include, for exam-
ple, amputating the limbs of thieves, stoning
to death of adulterers, and public execution of
murderers by the victims' relatives in sport sta-
diums with thousands of spectators. Their real
claim to infamy comes from the imposition of
a policy of 'Gender Apartheid' directed against
the girls and women of Afghanistan. This col-
lective self-image of Talibanism is further but-
tressed by the projected images of their for-
eign Muslim allies, the various conservative
and radical Pakistani Muslim political organi-
zations. These include, among others, two fac-
tions of the Jamiat-e Ulema Islam (JUI) led by
Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Moulana Samiul
Haq, the two rabidly anti-Shica terrorist
groups, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and
Harakat-ul-Ansar, as well as Ben Laden's mili-
tary organization, Al-Qacida. True to the na-
ture of person-centred tribal political culture,
the projected positive 'Islamic' self-images of
Taliban are contrasted by demonizing the
Muslim character of their many opponents.
Ironically, many of those being damned are, in
fact, well-known heroes of the anti-Soviet
jihad. The Taliban also demonize their oppo-
nents' foreign patrons, Muslim and non-Mus-
lim, such as Shici Iran, Russia and Central Asian
republics, except for Turkmenistan.
The rise and successes of Talibanism, fleet-
ing as it may turn out to be, fits well within the
structural patterns and dynamics of wars of
succession in Afghanistan, at least during the
last 100 years. The mysterious beginnings of
the Taliban, and their quick adoption by for-
eign forces in this instance by Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia,8 have had major precedents in
Afghan history.9 The economic support of for-
eign Muslim sponsors has made it possible for
the Taliban to purchase loyalties from a huge
chain of economically desperate and depen-
dent local commanders within the country.
These external patrons, by extending official
recognition to the Taliban regime, have also
condoned the Taliban version of Islamic ex-
tremism and have facilitated the recruitment
of much needed foreign fighters (Pakistanis
and others) from Pakistani Muslim seminaries
(m a d r a s as) and beyond.
What distinguish the Taliban and the rise of
Talibanism at this juncture in the history of
Afghanistan, are the radically altered political
ecological and economic conditions, both in-
side Afghanistan and in the region, following
the collapse of the former Soviet Union. That
is, the presence of multiple competing foreign
Muslim sponsors, with their divergent or con-
flicting strategic, ideological, political and eco-
nomic agendas have proved to be the ideal
situation for the emergence of an extremist
militia organization such as the Taliban within
the person-centred tribal political culture of
the Pushtun in Afghanistan. Indeed, these
same political ecological realities in the region
have also fuelled the wars of resistance
against the Taliban hegemony, forcing it to re-
sort to increasingly violent policies and prac-
tices against women, Shicis and the non-Push-
tun ethnolinguistic communities in
Afghanistan.  ◆
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From 15-18 June 2000, more than 200 persons partici-
pated in an international conference entitled, 'Afghan-
istan – Country Without State?', organized by the Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft Afghanistan (AGA) and the Medio-
thek für Afghanistan e.V. in Munich. In the almost 30
presentations given, researchers as well as representa-
tives of NGOs and political institutions addressed the




Most papers focused on the construction of
the Afghan nation state and the political cul-
ture related to it. From these analyses, it ap-
peared that the state apparatus that had
evolved in the 20th century was a quasi-for-
eign body that tried to impose various forms
of control on the country and its people, but
failed to build an Afghan nation. Karl Jettmar
(University of Heidelberg) pointed to the ne-
cessity of re-examining the existing nation-
state structures of Central Asia in general.
Rasul Rahim (Wuppertal) discussed the
tremendous obstacles that prevented the de-
velopment of a civil society in each phase of
Afghan history. Eckart Schieweck (UN-Special
Mission to Afghanistan) analysed the growth
of Afghan government institutions and their
destruction in the course of the Afghan War.
Rangin Dadfar Spanta (University of Aachen)
argued that the protracted war has led to the
destruction of political culture in Afghanistan,
which constitutes the major problem for de-
veloping a common idea of state and civil so-
ciety. The papers of Angela Parvanta (Univer-
sity of Bamberg), Conrad Schetter (Center for
Development Research, Bonn) and Rameen
Moshref (New York) dealt with the construct-
ed character of the Afghan nation and the
equation of Afghan nationalism with Pushtun
culture. The role of the state in the notions of
political Islam was stressed by Olivier Roy
(Centre National Recherche Sociale, Paris). He
concluded that political Islam has failed to
bridge the gap between tradition and moder-
nity in Afghanistan. He and Neamatollah No-
jumi (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Somerville) discussed the question of how
the failing state in Afghanistan and the inter-
linked export of international Islamic
brigades are affecting the neighbouring
states as well as other countries. Almut
Wieland-Karimi (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung),
Max Klimburg (University of Vienna) and
Bruce Koepke (Australian National University,
Canberra) dealt with the effects of the war
and Islamist policies on local culture and pop-
ular religiosity, which revolves around Sufi
networks and saint worship, and, in the case
of Nuristan, is rich in pre-Islamic traditions.
Two presentations concerned the institution
of the jirga and its potential as a means of de-
cision making on the local and national levels.
Bernt Glatzer (Deutsche Stiftung für interna-
tionale Entwicklung) pointed out that the as-
semblies held in the rural setting primarily
serve as a public enactment of a consensus
negotiated by the local leadership before the
jirga is summoned. This process of conflict
resolution hinges on the ability of influential
men to act as opinion leaders and is entirely
local in scope. Christine Noelle-Karimi (Uni-
versity of Bamberg) drew attention to the lim-
itations of the loya jirga as a political mecha-
nism on the national level. Initiated as an in-
strument for promoting government policies
in the early 20th century, it by no means repre-
sents a time-honoured basis for installing
democracy in Afghanistan.
Other speakers focused on the current situ-
ation in Afghanistan. Amin Saikal (Australian
National University, Canberra) gave a detailed
overview of the external actors (e.g. Pakistan
and Iran), that are involved in the Afghan con-
flict and weaken the reconstruction of the
Afghan state. Reinhard Schlagintweit (Bonn),
as well as Michael Pohly (Freie Universität
Berlin) and Citha Maass (Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, Berlin) discussed the
meaning of state for the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance. They concluded that none
of the war parties had either a conception of
state or the capability to assume its responsi-
bilities. Two major sources of support for the
Taliban were examined by Ahmed Rashid (Far
Eastern Economic Review, Lahore) and
Michael Lüders (Die Zeit, Hamburg). Rashid
depicted the dynamics at work between the
Taliban and the Pushtun tribes. While certain
tribal groups made the upsurge of the Taliban
possible in the first place, others openly reject
their policies. Michael Lüders gave an inside
view of the indoctrination young students
and potential Taliban cadres are subjected to
in the Pakistani madaris. Peter Schwittek (Car-
itas, Kabul) reported on the desperate need
for education programmes and the contradic-
tions he encountered at different levels of the
Taliban government in his (ultimately suc-
cessful) efforts to establish schools for 13,500
boys and girls. Heike Bill (Deutsche
Welthungerhilfe, Jalalabad) discussed the Tal-
iban policies concerning women. She pointed
out that the restrictions imposed on women
do not reflect a specific Taliban ideology but
have rather had the effect of institutionalizing
and legitimizing patterns of oppression al-
ready prevalent in Afghanistan before its as-
sumption of power. Michael von der Schulen-
burg (UN-International Drug Control Pro-
gramme, Vienna) investigated the factors en-
couraging opium production in Afghanistan
and its rising proportion on the world market.
Jonathan Goodhand (Manchester) presented
a study on the local level concerning the so-
cial and economic transformations a rural vil-
lage in North Afghanistan underwent with
the introduction of opium production.
In summary, the conference has shown that
the state has lost its influence on the political,
ideological, social and economic affairs in
Afghanistan. Therefore, it might be right to
claim that Afghanistan is a country without a
state, even though a failed state keeps its re-
sponsibility by law as Hermann-Josef Blanke
(University of Erfurt) emphasized. How to
cope with a region in which state structures
have collapsed is a salient problem not only
related to Afghanistan – as Schlagintweit
mentioned – and will pose a challenge to in-
ternational security systems in different parts
of the world (e.g. Somalia, Sierra Leone) in the
future.
The papers presented at the conference are
in the process of publication.  ◆
Afghan Taliban Foreign Minister, 
Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel (centre)
greets returning Afghan hostages.
